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ABSTRACT
We present SPARSI, a novel theoretical framework for partition-
ing sensitive data across multiple non-colluding adversaries. Most
work in privacy-aware data sharing has considered disclosing sum-
maries where the aggregate information about the data is preserved,
but sensitive user information is protected. Nonetheless, there are
applications, including online advertising, cloud computing and
crowdsourcing markets, where detailed and fine-grained user-data
must be disclosed. We consider a new data sharing paradigm and
introduce the problem of privacy-aware data partitioning, where
a sensitive dataset must be partitioned among k untrusted parties
(adversaries). The goal is to maximize the utility derived by par-
titioning and distributing the dataset, while minimizing the total
amount of sensitive information disclosed. The data should be dis-
tributed so that an adversary, without colluding with other adver-
saries, cannot draw additional inferences about the private informa-
tion, by linking together multiple pieces of information released to
her. The assumption of no collusion is both reasonable and neces-
sary in the above application domains that require release of private
user information. SPARSI enables us to formally define privacy-
aware data partitioning using the notion of sensitive properties for
modeling private information and a hypergraph representation for
describing the interdependencies between data entries and private
information. We show that solving privacy-aware partitioning is,
in general, NP-hard, but for specific information disclosure func-
tions, good approximate solutions can be found using relaxation
techniques. Finally, we present a local search algorithm applicable
to generic information disclosure functions. We apply SPARSI to-
gether with the proposed algorithms on data from a real advertising
scenario and show that we can partition data with no disclosure to
any single advertiser.
1. INTRODUCTION
The landscape of online services has changed significantly in the
recent years. More and more sensitive information is released on
the Web and is processed by online services. The most common
paradigm to consider are people who rely on online social networks
to communicate and share information with each other. This leads
to a diverse collection of voluntarily published user data. Online
services such as Web search, news portals, recommendation and
e-commerce systems, collect and store this data in their effort to
provide high-quality personalized experiences to a heterogeneous
user base. Naturally, this leads to increased concerns related to an
individual’s privacy and the possibility of private personal informa-
tion being aggregated by untrusted third-parties such as advertisers.
A different application domain that is increasingly popular is
crowdsourcing markets. Tasks, typically decomposed into micro-
tasks, are submitted by users to a crowdsourcing market and are
fulfilled by a collection of workers. The user needs to provide
each worker with the necessary data to accomplish each micro-
task. However, this data may contain information that is sensitive
and care must be taken not to disclose any more sensitive informa-
tion than minimally needed to accomplish the task. Consider, for
example, the task of labeling a dataset that contains information
about the location of different individuals, that needs to be used
as input to a machine learning algorithm. Since the cost of hand-
labeling the dataset is high, submitting this task to a crowdsourcing
market provides an inexpensive alternative. However, the dataset
might contain sensitive information about the trajectories the indi-
viduals follow as well as the structure of the social network they
form. Hence, we must perform a clever partitioning of the dataset
to the different untrusted workers in order to avoid disclosing sen-
sitive information. Observe, that under this paradigm, the sensitive
information contained in the dataset is not necessarily associated
with a particular data entry.
Similarly with the rise of cloud computing, increasing volumes
of private data are being stored and processed on untrusted servers
in the cloud. Even if the data is stored and processed in an en-
crypted form, an adversary may be able to infer some of the private
information by aggregating, over a period of time, the information
that is available to it (e.g., password hashes of users, workload in-
formation). This has led security researchers to recommend split-
ting data and workloads across systems or organizations to remove
such points of compromise.
In all applications presented above, a party, called publisher, is
required to distribute a collection of data (e.g., user information)
to many different third parties. The utility in sharing data results
either from the improved quality of personalized services or from
the cost reduction in fulfilling a decomposable task. The sensitive
information is often not limited to the identity of a particular entity
in the dataset (e.g., a user using a social network based service),
but rather arises from the combination of a set of data items. It is
these sets we would like to partition accross different adversaries.
We next use two real-world examples to illustrate this.
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EXAMPLE 1. Consider a location based social network, such
as Gowalla1 and Brightkite2, where users check-in at different places
they visit. The available data contains information about the loca-
tions of the users at different time instances and the structure of the
social network connecting the users. User location data is of par-
ticular interest to advertisers, as analyzing it can provide them with
a rather detailed profile of the habits of the user. Using such data
allows advertisers to devise highly efficient personalized marketing
strategies. Hence, they are willing to pay large amounts of money
to the data publisher for user information. However, analyzing the
location of multiple users collectively can reveal information about
the friendship links between users, thus, revealing the structure of
the social network [2]. Disclosing the structure of the social net-
work might not be desirable by the online social network provider,
as it can be used for viral marketing purposes, which may drive
users away from using the social network. It is easy to see that a
natural tradeoff exists between publishing user data, and receiving
high monetary utility, versus keeping this data private to ensure the
popularity of the social network.
This example shows how an adversary may infer some sensi-
tive information that is not explicitly mentioned in the dataset but
is related to the provided data and can be inferred only when par-
ticular entries of the dataset are collectively analyzed. Not reveal-
ing all those entries together to an adversary prevents disclosure of
the sensitive information. We further exemplify this setup using a
crowdsourcing application.
EXAMPLE 2. Consider a data publisher with a collection of
medical prescriptions to be transcribed. Each prescription con-
tains sensitive information, such as the disease of the patient, the
prescribed medication, the identity of the patient, and the identity of
the doctor. Furthermore, the publisher would like to minimize the
total cost of the transcription. Thus, she considers using a crowd-
sourcing solution where she partitions the task into micro-tasks to
be submitted to multiple workers. It is obvious that if all fields in
the prescription are revealed to the same worker, highly sensitive
information is disclosed. However, if the dataset is partitioned in
such a way that different workers are responsible for transcribing
different fields of one prescription, no information is disclosed as
patients cannot be linked with a particular disease or a particular
doctor. In this case, the utility of the publisher stems from fulfilling
the task at a reduced cost.
Despite being simplistic, the second example illustrates how dis-
tributing a dataset can allow one to use it for a particular task, while
minimizing the disclosure of sensitive information. Motivated by
applications such as the ones presented above, we introduce the
problem of privacy-aware partitioning of a dataset, where our goal
is to partition a dataset among k untrusted parties and to maximize
either user’s utility, or the third parties’ utilities, or a combination
of those. Further, we would like to do this while minimizing the
total amount of sensitive information disclosed.
Most of the previous work has either considered sharing pri-
vacy-preserving summaries of data, where the aggregate informa-
tion about the population of users is preserved, or has bypassed the
use of personal data and its disclosure to multiple advertisers [20,
17, 12]. These approaches focus on worst-case scenarios assum-
ing arbitrary collusion among adversaries. Therefore, all adver-
saries are combined and treated as a single adversary. However,
this strong threat model does not allow publishing of fine-grained
information. Other approaches have explicitly focused on online
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gowalla
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brightkite
advertising, and have developed specialized systems that limit the
disclosure of sensitive user-related information when deployed to
a user’s Web browser [11, 21]. Finally, Krause et al. have studied
how the disclosure of a subset of the attributes of a data entry can
allow access to fine-grained information [14]. While they examine
the utility and disclosure tradeoff, their proposed framework does
not take into account the interdependencies across different data
entries and assumes a single adversary (third party).3
In this work we propose SPARSI a new framework that allows us
to formally reason about leakage of sensitive information in scenar-
ios such as the ones presented above, namely, setups where we are
given a dataset to be partitioned among a set of non-colluding ad-
versaries in order to obtain some utility. We consider a generalized
form of utility that captures both the utility that each adversary ob-
tains by receiving part of the data and the user’s personal utility de-
rived by fulfilling a task. We elaborate more on this generalization
in the next section. This raises a natural tradeoff between maximiz-
ing the overall utility while minimizing information disclosure. We
provide a formal definition of the privacy-aware data partitioning
problem, as an optimization of the aforementioned tradeoff.
While non-collusion results in a somewhat weaker threat model,
we argue that it is a reasonable and practical assumption in a va-
riety of scenarios, including the ones discussed above. In setups
like online advertising and cloud computing there is no particular
incentive for adversaries to collude, due to conflicting monetary in-
terests. In crowdsourcing scenarios the probability that adversaries
who may collude will be assigned to the same task is minuscule due
to the large number of anonymous available workers. Attempts to
collude can often be detected easily, and the possibility of strict pe-
nalization (by the crowdsourcing market) provides additional dis-
incentive to collude. Finally, we note that, an assumption of no
collusion is a necessary and a practical one in most of these situa-
tions; otherwise there would be no way to accomplish those tasks.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We introduce the problem of privacy-aware data partitioning
across multiple adversaries, and analyze its complexity. To
our knowledge this is the first work that addresses the problem
of minimizing information leakage when partitioning a dataset
across multiple adversaries.
• We introduce SPARSI, a rigorous framework based on the no-
tion of sensitive properties that allows us to formally reason
about how information is leaked and the total amount of infor-
mation disclosure. We represent the interdependencies between
data and sensitive properties using a hypergraph and we show
how the problem of privacy-aware partitioning can be cast as
an optimization problem that it is NP-hard by reducing it to hy-
pergraph partitioning.
• We analyze the problem for specific families of information dis-
closure functions, including step and linear functions, and show
how good solutions can be derived by using relaxation tech-
niques. Furthermore, we propose a set of algorithms, based on
a generic greedy randomized local search algorithm, for obtain-
ing approximate solutions to this problem under generic fami-
lies of utility and information disclosure functions.
• Finally, we demonstrate how, using SPARSI, one can distribute
user-location data, like in Example 1, to multiple advertisers
while ensuring that almost no sensitive information about po-
tential user friendship links is revealed. Moreover, we experi-
mentally verify the performance of the proposed algorithms for
3For the remainder of the paper we treat adversaries and third par-
ties as the same
both synthetic and real-world datasets. We compare the perfor-
mance of the proposed greedy local search algorithm against
approaches tailored to specific disclosure functions, and show
that it is capable of producing solutions that are close to the
optimal.
2. SPARSI FRAMEWORK
In this section we start by describing the different components
of SPARSI. More precisely, we show how one can formally reason
about the sensitive information contained in a dataset by introduc-
ing the notion of sensitive properties. Then, we show how to model
the interdependencies between data entries and sensitive properties
rigorously, and how to reason about the leakage of sensitive infor-
mation in a principled manner.
2.1 Data Entries and Sensitive Information
LetD denote the dataset to be partitioned among different adver-
saries. Moreover, let A denote the set of adversaries. We assume
that D is comprised of data entries di ∈ D that disclose minimal
sensitive information if revealed alone. To clarify this consider Ex-
ample 1 where each data entry is the check-in location of a user.
The user is sharing this information voluntarily with the social net-
work service in exchange for local advertisement services, hence,
this entry is assumed not to disclose sensitive information. In Ex-
ample 2, the data entries to be published are the fields of the pre-
scriptions. Observe that if the disease field is revealed in isolation,
no information is leaked about possible individuals carrying it.
However, revealing several data entries together discloses sensi-
tive information. We define a sensitive property to be a property
that is related to a subset of data entries but not explicitly repre-
sented in the data set, and that can be inferred if the data entries
are collectively analyzed. Let P denote the set of sensitive proper-
ties that are related to data entries in D. To formalize this abstract
notion of indirect information disclosure, we assume that each sen-
sitive property p ∈ P is associated with a variable (either numerical
or categorical) Vp with true value v∗p . Let Dp ⊂ D be the smallest
set of data entries from which an adversary can infer the true value
v∗p of Vp with high confidence, if all entries in Dp are revealed to
her. We assume that there is a unique such Dp corresponding to
each property p. We say that data entries in Dp disclose informa-
tion about property p ∈ P and that information disclosure can be
modeled as a function over Dp (see Section 2.2).
We assume that sensitive properties are specified by an expert
and the dependencies between data entries in D and properties in
P , via sets Dp, ∀p ∈ P , are represented as an undirected bipar-
tite graph, called a dependency graph. Returning to the example
applications presented above we have the following: In Example 1
the sensitive properties correspond to the friendship links between
users, and the assosiated datasets Dp correspond to the check-in
information of the pairs of users participating in friendship links.
In Example 2, the sensitive properties correspond to the links be-
tween a patient’s id and a particular disease, or a doctor’s id and
particular medication. In general, it has been shown that data min-
ing techniques can be used to determine the dependencies between
data items and sensitive properties [16].
Let Gd denote such a dependency graph. Gd has two types of
nodes, i.e., nodes P that correspond to sensitive properties and
nodes D that correspond to data entries. An edge connects a data
entry d ∈ D with a property p ∈ P only if d can potentially dis-
close information about p. Alternatively, we can use an equivalent
hypergraph representation, that is easier to reason about in some
cases. Converting the dependency graph Gd into an equivalent de-
pendency hypergraph is simply done by mapping each property
Sensitive Properties Data Entries
checkIn<i1, l2>
checkIn<i1, l2>
checkIn<i1, l3>
checkIn<i2, l2>
checkIn<i2, l2>
checkIn<i2, l3>
checkIn<i3, l3>
checkIn<i3, l1>
checkIn<i3, l1>
p1: friends<i1, i2>
p2: friends<i1, i3>
p3: friends<i2, i3>
p1 p3
p2
(a) Dependency Bipartite Graph
(b) Dependency Hypergraph
Figure 1: An example of a dependency graph between data en-
tries and sensitive properties. Data entries corresponding to the
same user are colored using the same color.
node into a hyperedge. We assume that the dimension (i.e., size
of largest hyperedge) of the dependency hypergraph is bigger than
the number of adversaries.
An example of a bipartite graph and its equivalent hypergraph is
shown in Figure 1. Recall that in this example we do not want to
disclose any information about the structure of the social network,
i.e., the sensitive properties are the friendship links between indi-
viduals. However, if an adversary is given the check-in locations
of two individuals, she can infer whether there is a friendship link
or not between them [2]. The dependencies between check-ins and
friendship links are captured by the edges in the bipartite graph.
2.2 Information Disclosure
We model the information disclosed to an adversary a using a
vector valued function fa : P(D) → [0, 1]|P |, which takes as in-
put the subset of data entries published to an adversary, and returns
a vector of disclosure values; one per sensitive property. That is ,
fa(Sa)[i] denotes the information disclosued to adversary a ∈ A
about the ith property when a has access to the subset Sa of data en-
tries. We assume that information disclosure takes values in [0, 1],
with 0 indicating no disclosure and 1 indicating full disclosure.
Generic disclosure functions, including posterior beliefs, and dis-
tribution distances can be naturally represented by SPARSI. The
only requirement is that the disclosure function returns a value for
each sensitive property.
Based on the disclosure functions of all adversaries we define the
overall disclosure function f as an aggregate of all functions in F .
Before presenting the formal definition, we define the assignment
set, given as input to f .
DEFINITION 1 (ASSIGNMENT SET). Let xda be an indicator
variable set to 1 if data entry d ∈ D is published to adversary
a ∈ A. We define the assignment set S to be the set of all variables
xda, i.e., S = {x11, · · · , x1|A|, · · · , x|D||A|}, and the adversary’s
assignment set Sa to be the set of indicator variables corresponding
to adversary a ∈ A, i.e., Sa = {x1a, x2a, · · · , x|D|a}.
Worst Disclosure. The overall disclosure can be expressed as:
f∞(S) = maxa∈A(‖fa(Sa)‖∞) (1)
Observe that using the infinity norm accounts for the worst case
disclosure across properties. Thus, full disclosure for at least one
sensitive property suffices to maximize the information leakage.
This function is indifferent to the total number of sensitive prop-
erties that are fully disclosed in a particular partitioning and gives
the same score to all that have at least one fully disclosed property.
However, there are cases where one is not interested in the worst
case disclosure but only interested in the total information disclosed
to any adversary. Following this observation we introduce another
variation of the overall disclosure function that considers the total
information disclosure per adversary.
Average Disclosure. We replace the infinity norm in the equation
above with the L1 norm:
fL1(S) = maxa∈A(
‖fa(Sa)‖1
|P | ) (2)
Observe that both Equation 1 and Equation 2 consider the maxi-
mum over the disclosure across adversaries, i.e., they can be written
as:
f(S) = maxa∈Af ′a(Sa) (3)
where f ′a(Sa) = ‖fa(Sa)‖∞ or f ′a(Sa) = ‖fa(Sa)‖1|P | .
2.3 Overall Utility
Let u denote the utility derived by partitioning the dataset across
multiple adversaries. We have that u : P(D × A) → R+, where
P(D × A) denotes the powerset of possible data-to-adversary as-
signments. As we show below, this function either quantifies the
utility of the adversaries when acquiring part of the dataset D (see
Example 1) or the publisher’s utility derived by fulfilling a particu-
lar task that requires partitioning the data (see Example 2). Under
many real world examples these two different kinds of utility can
be unified under a single utility. Consider Example 1. Typically,
advertisers pay higher amounts for data that provide higher utility.
Thus, maximizing the utility of each individual advertiser maxi-
mizes the utility (maybe monetary) of the data publisher as well.
Based on this observation we unify the two types of utilities un-
der a single formulation based on the utility of adversaries. First
we focus on the utility of adversaries. Intuitively, we would expect
that the more data an adversary receives, the less the observation of
a new, previously unobserved, data entry would increase the gain
of the adversaries. This notion of diminishing returns is formalized
by the combinatorial notion of submodularity and is shown to hold
in many real-world scenarios [18, 14]. More formally, a set func-
tion G : 2V → R mapping subsets A ⊆ V into the real numbers
is called submodular [4], if for all A ⊆ B ⊆ V , and v′ ∈ V \ B,
it holds that G(A ∪ {v′}) −G(A) ≥ G(B ∪ {v′}) −G(B), i.e.,
adding v′ to a set A increases G more than adding v′ to a superset
B of A. F is called nondecreasing, if for all A ⊆ B ⊆ V it holds
that G(A) ≤ G(B).
Let ua be a set function that quantifies the utility of each adver-
sary a. As mentioned above, we assume that ua is a nondecreasing
submodular function. For convenience we will occasionally drop
the nondecreasing qualification in the remainder of the paper. Let
UA denote the set of all utility functions for a given set of adver-
saries A. The overall utility function u can be defined as an aggre-
gate function of all utilities ua ∈ UA. We require that u is also
a submodular function. For example the overall utility may be de-
fined as a linear combination, i.e., a weighted sum, of all functions
in UA, following the form:
u(S) =
∑
a∈A
waua(Sa) (4)
where S and Sa are defined in Definition 1. Since all functions in
UA are submodular, uwill also be submodular, since it is expressed
as a linear combination of submodular functions [7].
An example of a submodular function ua is an additive function.
Assume that each data entry in d ∈ D has some utility wda for an
adversary a ∈ A. We have that ua(Sa) = ∑d∈D wdaxda, where
xda is an indicator variable that takes value 1 when data entry d is
revealed to adversary a and 0 otherwise. For the remainder of the
paper we will assume that utility u is normalize so that u ∈ [0, 1].
3. PRIVACY-AWARE DATA PARTITIONING
In this section, we describe two formulations of the privacy-
aware partitioning problem. We show how both can be expressed
as maximization problems that are, in general, NP-hard to solve.
We consider a dataset D that needs to be partitioned across a given
set of adversaries A. We assume that each data entry must be re-
vealed to at least one and at most t adversaries. The lower bound
arises naturally in both application discussed in the introduction
section. The upper bound is necessary to model cases where the
number of assignments per data entry needs to be restricted as it
might incur some cost, e.g., monetary in crowdsourcing applica-
tions.
We assume that the functions to compute the overall utility and
information disclosure are given. Let these functions be denoted
by u and f respectively. Ideally, we wish to maximize the utility
while minimizing the cost; however, there is a natural tradeoff be-
tween the two optimization goals. A traditional approach is to set
a requirement on information disclosure while optimizing the gain.
Accordingly we can define the following optimization problem.
DEFINITION 2 (DISCBUDGET). Let D be a set of data en-
tries, A be a set of adversaries, and τI be a budget on informa-
tion disclosure. This formulation of the privacy-aware partitioning
problem finds a data entry to adversary assignment set S that max-
imizes u(S) under constraint f(S) < τI . More formally we have
the following optimization problem:
maximize
S∈P(D×A)
u(S)
subject to f(S) < τI ,
1 ≤
∑k
a=1
xda ≤ t, ∀d ∈ D,
xda ∈ {0, 1}.
(5)
where xda and S are defined in Definition 1 as before and t ≥ 1
is the maximum number of adversaries to whom a particular data
entry can be published.
This optimization problem already captures our desire to reduce
the information disclosure while increasing the utility. However,
depending on the value of τI , the optimization problem presented
above might be infeasible. Infeasibility occurs when τI is so small
that no assignment of data to adversaries, such that
∑k
a=1 xda ≥
1, ∀d ∈ D and f(S) < τI exists.
To overcome this, we consider a different formulation of the
privacy-aware data partitioning problem where we seek to maxi-
mize the difference between the utility and the information disclo-
sure functions. We consider the Lagrangian relaxation of the pre-
vious optimization problem. Again, we assume that both functions
are measured using the same unit. We have the following:
DEFINITION 3 (TRADEOFF). Let D be a set of data entries,
A be a set of adversaries, and τI be a budget on information disclo-
sure. This formulation of the privacy-aware partitioning problem
finds a data entry to adversary assignment S that maximizes the
tradeoff between the overall utility and the overall information dis-
closure, i.e., u(S)+λ(τI−f(S)), where λ is a nonnegative weight.
More formally we have the following optimization problem:
maximize
S∈P(D×|A|)
u(S) + λ(τI − f(S))
subject to 1 ≤
∑k
a=1
xda ≤ t,∀d ∈ D,
xda ∈ {0, 1}.
(6)
where xda and S are defined in Def. 1 and t is the maximum num-
ber of adversaries to whom a data entry can be published.
We prove that both problems above are NP-hard by reducing both
versions of the privacy-aware data partitioning problem to the hy-
pegraph coloring problem [3].
THEOREM 1. Both formulations of the privacy-aware data par-
titioning problem are, in general, NP-hard to solve.
PROOF. Fix a set of adversaries denoted by A and a set of data
entries denoted by D. Let P denote the sensitive properties that
correspond to data entries in D. We require to partition D across
the adversaries inA. Consider the following instance of the privacy-
aware data partitioning problem. We require that each data entry be
published to exactly one adversary. Moreover, we set the maximum
budget on information disclosure to be 1. We also fix the overall in-
formation disclosure to be a step function of the following form: If
all the data entries corresponding to a particular sensitive property
are revealed to the same adversary the overall disclosure is 1 other-
wise it is 0. Finally we consider a constant utility function, which
is always equal to 1. Considering the hypergraph representation of
data and properties, it is easy to see that this problem is equivalent
to the hypergraph coloring problem, which is NP-hard [3]. Revers-
ing the above steps, one can easily reduce any instance of hyper-
graph coloring to the privacy-aware data partitioning problem.
In the remainder of the paper we describe efficient heuristics for
solving the partitioning problem – we present approximation algo-
rithms for specific information disclosure functions in Section 4,
and a greedy local-search heuristic for the general problem in Sec-
tion 5. Due to space constraints, henceforth, we will only focus on
the TRADEOFF formulation. Many of our algorithms also work for
the DISCBUDGET formulation (with slight modifications).
4. ANALYZING SPECIFIC CASES OF IN-
FORMATION DISCLOSURE
In this section, we present approximation algorithms when the
information disclosure function takes the following special forms:
1) step functions, 2) linearly increasing functions. The utility func-
tion is assumed to be submodular.
4.1 Step Functions
Information disclosure functions that correspond to a step func-
tion can model cases when each sensitive property p ∈ P is either
fully disclosed or fully private. A natural application of step func-
tions is the crowdsourcing scenario shown in Example 2. When
certain fields of a medical transcription, e.g., name together with
diagnosis, or gender together with the zip code and birth data, are
revealed to an adversary the corresponding sensitive property for
the patient is revealed.
We continue by describing such functions formally. LetDp ⊂ D
be the set of data entries associated with p. Property p is fully dis-
closed only if Dp is published in its entirety to an adversary. This
can be modeled using a set of step functions fa ∈ F : fa(Da)[p] =
1, if the set of data items assigned to adversary a contains all the el-
ementsDp associated with property p. IfDp 6⊆ Da, then fa(Da) =
0. Observe that information disclosure is minimized (and is equal
to 0) when no adversary gets all the elements in Dp, for all p. For
step functions we consider worst case disclosure, since ideally we
do not want to fully disclose any property.
Considering DISCBUDGET and TRADEOFF separately is not mean-
ingful for step functions. Since disclosure can only take the extreme
values {0, 1}, τI = 1 in TRADEOFF should be set to 0. Hence, full
disclosure of a property always penalizes the utility. Hence, one
can reformulate the problem and seek for solutions that maximize
the utility function under the constraint that information disclosure
is 0, i.e., no property exists such that all its corresponding data en-
tries are published to the same adversary.
Given these families of information disclosure functions and a
submodular utility function, both formulations of privacy-aware
data partitioning can be represented as an integer program (IP):
maximize
S∈P(D×|A|)
u(S)
subject to
∑
d∈Dp
xda < |Dp|, ∀p ∈ P,∀a ∈ A,
1 ≤
∑k
a=1
xda ≤ t, ∀d ∈ D,
xda ∈ {0, 1}.
(7)
where t is the maximum number of adversaries to whom a particu-
lar data entry can be published.
The first constraint enforces that there is no full disclosure of a
sensitive property. The partitioning constraint enforces that a data
entry is revealed to at least one but no more than t adversaries.
Solving the optimization problem in (7) corresponds to maximiz-
ing a submodular function under linear constraints. Recall that the
utility function is submodular and observe that all constraints in the
optimization problem presented above are linear. In fact be viewed
as packing constraints.
For additive utility functions (u =
∑
a∈A
∑
d∈D wdaxda), Equa-
tion 7 becomes an integer linear program, that can be approxi-
mately solved in PTIME in two steps. First, one can solve a lin-
ear relaxation of Equation 7, where xda is some fraction in [0, 1].
The resulting fractional solution can be converted into an integral
solution using a rounding strategy.
The simplest rounding strategy, called randomized rounding [19],
works as follows: assign data entry d to an adversary a with proba-
bility equal to xˆda, where xˆda is the fractional solution to the linear
relaxation. The value of the objective function achieved by the re-
sulting integral solution is in expectation equal to the optimal value
of the objective achieved by the linear relaxation. Moreover, ran-
domized rounding preserves all constraints in expectation. A dif-
ferent kind of rounding, called dependent rounding [8], ensures that
constraints are satisfied in the integral solution with probability 1.
For an overview of different randomized rounding techniques and
the quality of the derived solutions for budgeted problems we refer
the reader to the work by Doerr et al. [4]
One can solve the general problem with worst-case approxima-
tion guarantees by leveraging a recent result on submodular maxi-
mization under multiple linear constraints by Kulik et al. [15].
THEOREM 2. Let the overall utility function u be a nondecreas-
ing submodular function. One can find a feasible solution to the
optimization problem in (7) with expected approximation ratio of
(1− )(1− e−1), for any  > 0, in polynomial time.
PROOF. This holds directly by Theorem 2.1 of Kulik et al. [15].
To achieve this approximation ratio, Kulik et al. introduce a
framework that first obtains an approximate solution for a contin-
uous relaxation of the problem, and then uses a non-trivial combi-
nation of a randomized rounding procedure with two enumeration
phases, one on the most profitable elements, and the other on the
‘big’ elements, i.e., elements with high cost. This combination en-
ables one to show that the rounded solution can be converted to
a feasible one with high expected profit. Due to the intricacy of
the algorithm we refer the reader to Kulik et al. [15] for a detailed
description of the algorithm.
4.2 Linearly Increasing Functions
In this section, we consider linearly increasing disclosure func-
tions. Linear disclosure functions can naturally model situtations
where each data entry independently affects the likelihood of dis-
closure. In particular, if normalized log-likelihood is used as a mea-
sure of information disclosure, the disclosure function takes the lin-
ear form presented below. We consider the following additive form
for the disclosure of property p:
fa(·)[p] =
∑
d∈Dp
adpxda (8)
where adp is a weight associated with the information that is dis-
closed about property p when data d is revealed to an adversary.
We can rewrite the TRADEOFF problem statement as:
maximize
S∈P(D×A)
u(S) + λ(τI −max
a∈A
(f ′a(Sa)))
subject to 1 ≤
∑k
a=1
xda ≤ t,∀d ∈ D,
xda ∈ {0, 1}.
(9)
When the utility function is additive, the above problem is an in-
teger linear program, and hence can be solved by rounding the LP
relaxation as explained in the previous section.
However, for general submodular u(·), the objective is not sub-
modular anymore – the max of the additive information disclosure
functions is not necessarily supermodular [7]. Hence, unlike the
case of step functions, we cannot use the result of Kulik et al. [15]
to get an efficient approximate solution.
Nevertheless, we can compute approximate solutions in PTIME
by considering the following max-min formulation of the problem:
maximize
S∈P(D×A)
min
a∈A
(u(S) + λ(τI − f ′a(Sa)))
subject to 1 ≤
∑k
a=1
xda ≤ t,∀d ∈ D,
xda ∈ {0, 1}.
(10)
Since the overall utility function is a nondecreasing submodular
function, and the disclosure for each adversary is additive, the ob-
jective now is a max-min of submodular functions. More precisely,
for worst-case disclosure (Equation 1), the optimization objective
can be rewritten as:
maximize
S∈P(D×A)
min
a∈A,p∈P
(u(S) + λ(τI − fa(Sa)[p])) (11)
and, for average disclosure (Equation 2), it can be written as:
maximize
S∈P(D×A)
min
a∈A
(u(S) + λ(τI − 1|P |
∑
p∈P
fa(Sa)[p]))
(12)
The above max-min problem formulation is closely related to the
max-min fair allocation problem [10] for both types of informa-
tion disclosure functions. The main difference between Problem
(10) and the max-min fair allocation problem is that data items may
be assigned to multiple advrsaries. In the max-min fair allocation
problem a data item is assigned exactly once. If t = 1 then the
two problems are equivalent, and thus, one can provide worst case
guaranties on the quality of the approximate solution. The prob-
lem of max-min fair allocation was studied by Golovin [10], Khot
and Ponnuswami [13], and Goemans et al. [9]. Let n denote the
total number of data entries (goods in the max-min fair allocation
problem) and m denote the number of adversaries (buyers in the
max-min fair allocation problem). The first two papers focus on
additive functions and give algorithms achieving an (n−m+ 1)-
approximation and a (2m + 1)-approximation respectively, while
the third one gives a O(n 12m 14 logn log 32 m)-approximation.
4.3 Quadratic Functions
In this section we consider quadratic disclosure functions of the
following form:
fa(·)[p] =
(∑
d∈Dp
adpxda
)2
(13)
where adp and xda are defined as before. Since fa(Dp)[p] = 1
we have that (
∑
d∈Dp adp)
2 = 1. We assume that the utility is
an additive function following the form of Equation 4, and do not
consider generic submodular case.
The TRADEOFF optimization function can be rewritten as:
maximize
S∈P(D×A)
∑
d∈D
∑
a∈A
wdaxda + λ(τI −max
a∈A
(f ′a(Sa)))
(14)
where f ′a(·) is a quadratic function. The internal maximization over
information disclosure functions can be removed from the objective
by rewriting the optimization problem as:
maximize
S∈P(D×A)
∑
d∈D
∑
a∈A
wdaxda + λ(τI − y)
subject to y ≥ f ′a(Sa), ∀a ∈ A,
1 ≤
∑k
a=1
xda ≤ t,∀d ∈ D,
xda ∈ {0, 1}.
(15)
Since all constraints are either linear or quadratic, the above prob-
lem is an integer 0-1 Quadratic Constraint Problem (QCP) [?],
which is, in general, NP-hard to solve. In order to derive an ap-
proximate solution in PTIME, we relax this problem to an equiv-
alent Second Order Conic Programming (SOCP) problem [?]. A
SOCP problem can be solved in polynomial time to within any
level of accuracy by using an interior-point method [?] resulting
in a fractional solution xˆda.
First, we focus on the constraints shown in Problem (15). The
constraints for worst and average disclosure can be written as:
(
∑
d∈Dp
adpxda)
2 = (Aapxap)
TAapxa, ∀p ∈ P, ∀a ∈ A
1
|P |
∑
p∈P
(
∑
d∈Dp
adpxda)
2 = (Apxa)
TApxa, ∀a ∈ A
(16)
where xa corresponds to a vector representation of the assignment
set Sa and ATp = [a′1, a′2, . . . , a′|D|] is a positive vector that con-
tains the appropriate weights for all data entries with respect to all
properties p ∈ P .
Both constraints follow the quadratic form (Ax)TAx, where x is
a vector representation of the assignment set Sa and A is a matrix
containing the appropriate Aap’s or Ap’s based on the type of in-
formation disclosure we are using. Let C denote the total number
of constraints with respect to the disclosure function. Observe that
we have C = |P ||A| and C = |A| for the two cases of information
disclosure respectively.
The next step is to incorporate variable y in the optimization
problem. For that we extend vector x to include variable y. The new
variable vector is [y x]T. We can rewrite the quantities in Equation
16 as follows:([
0 A
] [ y
x
])T([
0 A
] [ y
x
])
, ∀c ∈ [C] (17)
where A and x are as defined above. Finally, we have that the equiv-
alent SOCP problem to the initial QCP problem is:
maximize
q
[ −λ W ] q + λτI
subject to
[
1 0
]
q ≥ (A′q)T(A′q), ∀c ∈ [C],
1 ≤
∑k
a=1
xda ≤ t, ∀d ∈ D.
(18)
where q =
[
y x
]T, A′ = [ 0 A ].
Finally, the fractional solutions xˆda obtained from the SOCP
needs to be converted to an integral solution. We point out that for
the TRADEOFF problem no guarantees can be derived on the value
of the objective function of the integral solution, when naive ran-
domized rounding schemes, such as setting xda = 1 with Pr[Xad =
1] = xˆda are used. Thus, finding a rounding scheme that ensures
that the objective of the integral solution is equal to that of the frac-
tional solution in expectation is an open problem.
5. A GREEDY LOCAL SEARCH
HEURISTIC
So far we studied specific families of disclosure functions to
derive worst-case guaranties for the quality of approximate solu-
tions. In this section we present two greedy heuristic algorithms
suitable for any general disclosure function. We still require the
utility function to be submodular. Our heuristics are based on hill
climbing and the Greedy Randomized Adaptive Local Search Pro-
cedure(GRASP) [6]. Notice that local search heuristics are known
to perform well when maximizing a submodular objective function
[7]. Again, we only focus on the TRADEOFF optimization prob-
lem(see Equation 6).
Algorithm 1 Overall Algorithm
1: Input: A: set of adversaries; G: objective function;
r: number of repetitions; t: max. adversaries per data item
2: Output: Mopt: a data-to-adversary assignment matrix
3: for all i = 1→ r do
4: M∅ ← empty assignment , gopt ← G(M∅)
5: 〈Mini, gini〉 ← CONSTRUCTION(G,A, t);
6: 〈M, g〉 ← LOCALSEARCH(G,A, t,Mini, gini);
7: if g > gopt then
8: Mopt ←M ; gopt ← g;
9: return Mopt;
5.1 Overall Algorithm
Our algorithm proceeds in two phases (Algorithm 1). The first
phase, which we call construction, constructs a data-to-adversary
assignment matrixMini by greedily picking assignments that max-
imize the specified objective function G(·), i.e., the tradeoff be-
tween utility and information disclosure, while ensuring that each
data item is assigned to at least one and at most t adversaries. The
second phase, called local-search, searches for a better solution in
the neighborhood of the Mini, by changing one assignment of one
data item at a time if it improves the objective function, resulting
in an assignment M . The construction algorithm may be random-
ized; hence, the overall algorithm is executed r times, and the best
solution Mopt = argmax{M1,...,Mr}G(Mi) is returned as the final
solution.
Algorithm 2 CONSTRUCTION
1: Input: G: objective function; A: set of adversaries;
t: max. adversaries per data item
2: Output: 〈M, g〉: data-to-adversary assignment, objective
value
3: maxIterations← t · |D|
4: Initialize: M ← empty assignment
5: for all i ∈ [1,maxIterations] do
6: // Compute a set of candidate assignments
7: DM ← data entries assigned to < t adversaries in M ;
8: Let S ← DM ×A−M
9: // Pick the next best assignment that improves the objective
10: 〈d, a〉 ← PICKNEXTBEST(M, g, S,G)
11: if 〈d, a〉 is NULL then
12: break; // No new assignments improve the objective
13: Assign the selected data entry d to the selected adversary a;
14: return 〈M,G(M)〉;
5.2 Construction Phase
The construction phase (Algorithm 2) starts with an empty data-
to-adversary assignment matrix and greedily adds a new 〈d, a〉 as-
signment to the mapping M if it improves the objective function.
This is achieved by iteratively performing two steps. The algorithm
first computes a set of candidate assignments S. For any data item
d (which does not already have t assignments), and any adversary
a, 〈d, a〉 is a candidate assignment if it does not appear in M .
Algorithm 3 PICKNEXTBEST
1: Input: G: objective function; M : current assignment;
g: current value of objective, S: possible new assignments
2: Output: new assignment 〈d?, a?〉, or NULL
3: GREEDY:
4: 〈d?, a?〉 ← argmax〈d,a〉∈SG(M ∪ 〈d, a〉)
5: GRASP:
6: Pick the top-n assignments Sn having the highest value for
g〈d,a〉 = G(M ∪ 〈d, a〉) from S, and having g〈d,a〉 > g.
7: 〈d?, a?〉 is drawn uniformly at random from Sn
8: if G(M ∪ 〈d, a〉) > g then
9: return 〈d, a〉
10: else
11: return NULL
Second, the algorithm picks the next best assignment from the
candidates (using PICKNEXTBEST, Algorithm 3). We consider
two methods for picking the next best assignment – GREEDY and
GRASP. The GREEDY strategy picks 〈d?, a?〉 that maximizes the
objectiveG(M ∪〈d?, a?〉). On the other hand, GRASP identifies a
set Sn of top n assignments that have the highest value for the ob-
jective g〈d,a〉 = G(M ∪ 〈d, a〉), such that g〈d,a〉 is greater than the
current value of the objective g. Note that Sn can contain less than
n assignments. The GRASP strategy picks an assignment 〈d?, a?〉
at random from Sn. Both strategies return NULL if 〈d?, a?〉 does
not improve the value of the objective function. The construction
stops when no new assignment can improve the objective function.
Complexity: The run time complexity of the construction phase is
O(t · |A| · |D|2). There are O(t · |D|) iterations, and each itera-
tion may have a worst case running time of O(|D| · |A|). PICK-
NEXTBEST permits a simple parallel implementation.
Algorithm 4 LOCALSEARCH
1: Input: G: objective function; A: set of adversaries;
t: max. assignments per data item; M : current assignment;
g: current objective value
2: Output: 〈Mopt, gopt〉: the new assignment, the corresponding
objective value
3: for all d ∈ D do
4: Ad ← the set of adversaries to whom data item d is assigned
(according to current assignment M );
5: // Construct a set of neighboring assignments
6: Nd ← {M}.
7: if (|Ad| < t) then Nd ← Nd ∪{M ∪{〈d, a′〉}|∀a′ 6∈ Ad};
8: for each adversary a ∈ Ad do
9: Nd ← Nd ∪ {M − {〈d, a〉}}
10: Nd ← Nd ∪ {M − {〈d, a〉} ∪ {〈d, a′〉}|∀a′ 6∈ Ad};
11: // Pick the neighboring assignment with maximum objective
12: Mopt ← argmaxM′∈NdG(M ′)
13: M ←Mopt
14: return 〈Mopt, G(Mopt)〉;
5.3 Local-Search Phase
The second phase employs local search (Algorithm 4) to improve
the initial assignment Mini output by the construction phase. In
this phase, the data items are considered exactly once in some (ran-
dom) order. Given the current assignment M , for each data item,
a set of neighboring assignments Nd (including M ) are considered
by (i) removing an assignment to an adversary a inM , (ii) modify-
ing the assignment from adversary a to an adversary a′ (that d was
not already assigned to inM ), and (iii) adding a new assignment (if
d is not already assigned to t adversaries in M ). Next, the neigh-
boring assignment inNd with the maximum value for the objective
Mopt is picked. The next iteration considers the data item succeed-
ing d (in the ordering) with Mopt as the current assignment. We
found that making a second pass of the dataset in the local search
phase does not improve the value of the objective function.
Complexity: The run time complexity of the local-search phase is
O(t · |A| · |D|).
5.4 Extensions
The construction phase (Algorithm 2) has a run time that is quadratic
in the size of D. This is because in each iteration, the PICK-
NEXTBEST subroutine computes a global maximum assignment
across all data-adversary pairs. While this approach makes the al-
gorithm more effective in avoiding local minima it reduces its scal-
ability due to its quadratic cost.
To improve scalability, one can adopt a local myopic approach
during construction. Instead of considering all possible (data,adversary)
pairs when constructing the list of candidate assignments (see Ln. 8
in Algorithm 2), one can consider a single data entry d and popu-
late the set of candidate assignments S using only (data,adversary)
pairs that contain d. More specifically, we fix a total ordering of the
data entries O, and perform t iterations of the following:
• Consider the next data item d in O. Let M be the current as-
signment.
• Construct S as ({d} ×A)−M .
• Pick the next best assignment in S using Algorithm 3 (GREEDY
or GRASP) that improves the objective function.
• Update the current assignment M , and proceed with the next
data entry in O.
Complexity: The run time complexity of the myopic-construction
phase is O(t · |A| · |D|).
5.5 Correctness
While both the construction and local search phases carefully
ensure that each data item is assigned to no more that t adversaries,
we still need to prove that each data item is assigned to at least one
adversary. To ensure this lower bound on the cardinality, we use
the following objective function G:
G(·) = u(·) + λ(τI − f(·))− C (19)
where C is the number of data items that are not assigned to any ad-
versary and λ ∈ [0, 1]. The above objective function adds a penalty
term C to the tradeoff between the utility and the information dis-
closure, i.e., u(·) + λ(τI − f(·)). We can show that this penalty
ensures that every data item is assigned to at least one adversary.
We have the following theorem:
THEOREM 3. Using G(·) = u(·) +λ(τI − f(·))−C with λ ∈
[0, 1] as the objective function in Algorithm 1 returns a solution
where all cardinality constraints are satisfied.
PROOF. Both the construction and the local-search phases en-
sure that no adversary is assigned to more than t adversaries (Ln. 7
in Algorithms 2 and 4).
We need to show that every data item is assigned to at least one
adversary, i.e., at the end of the algorithm C will be equal to 0.
We will focus on the global Algorithm 1. The proof for the local
version of the algorithm is analogous.
The main intuition behind the proof is the following:
• At the end of the construction phase, if C > 0, then some data
item must be assigned to > t adversaries.
• In the local-search phase, making a data item unassigned never
results in a better objective function.
At the start of the construction phase, C = |D|. We show that if
at some iteration C = i, then in that iteration some unassigned data
item is assigned to an adversary and C reduces by 1. If C = i > 0,
there are three possible paths the algorithm can follow after the it-
eration is over: (1) no new assignment is chosen, (2) the algorithm
chooses to assign a data entry to an adversary so that the number of
violated constraints remains the same (i.e. that data entry is already
assigned to at least one adversary), and (3) a data-to-adversary as-
signment is chosen so that C = i− 1. We will show that given the
objective function we are using, the first path will never be chosen.
We evaluate the value of the objective function for paths 1 and 3.
For the third path we consider the worst case scenario, where only
disclosure is increased (by ∆f ) and utility remains the same. The
value of the objective function for paths 1 and 3 is as follows:
G1 = u+ λ(τI − f)− C
G3 = u+ λ(τI − f −∆f )− (C − 1)
Since ∆f ≤ 1,G3 ≥ G1, thus, path 1 will never be taken if C > 0.
Notice, that the objective values for paths 2 and 3 cannot be di-
rectly compared. However, we will show that during the t|D| it-
erations we perform path 3 will be chosen |D| times, and, hence
C = 0 at the end of Algorithm 2. Let n1, n2 and n3 denote the
number of times path1, path 2 and path 3 are chosen respectively.
By construction we have that n1 + n2 + n3 = t|D|. After t|D|
iterations if C = 0 we are done. If C > 0 then based on the above
statement we will have n1 = 0, and thus n2 + n3 = t× |D|. Now
we will show that n3 will always be equal to |D|. Let n3 < |D|,
we have that n2 = tD−n3 > (t− 1)|D|. Recall that when path 2
is chosen, the algorithm assigned to an adversary a data entry is al-
ready assigned to another adversary. Therefore, if n2 > (t−1)|D|,
then some data item is assigned to > t adversaries, which does not
happen. Therefore, n3 = |D|.
To prove that C = 0 at the end of the local-search phase, it suf-
fices to show that the algorithm will never choose to remove an as-
signment from a data item assigned to exactly one adversary. Con-
sider the state of the local-search algorithm right before an iteration
of its main for-loop (Ln. 3-13 of Algorithm 4). We assume that the
algorithm considers a data-entry d with a single assignment and
that C = 0. Moreover, let u and f be the utility and disclosure at
that point. Let u′ and f ′ denote the utility and disclosure if d is
assigned to no adversary. Consider the best-case scenario where no
utility is lost, i.e., u′ = u, and f ′ = 0. Note that C = 1. The new
objective value will be u′+λ(τI−f ′)−C = u+λτI−1. We have
that u+ λτI − 1 ≤ u+ λτI − f , since f ≤ 1 always holds.
6. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we present an empirical evaluation of SPARSI.
The main questions we seek to address are: (1) how the two ver-
sions of the privacy-aware partitioning problem – TRADEOFF and
DISCBUDGET– compare with each other, and how well they ex-
ploit the presence of multiple adversaries with respect to disclosure
and utility, (2) how the different algorithms perform in optimizing
the overall utility and disclosure, and (3) how practical SPARSI is
for distributing real-world datasets across multiple adversaries.
We empirically study these questions using both real and syn-
thetic datasets. After describing the data and the experimental method-
ology, we present results that demonstrate the effectiveness of our
framework on partitioning sensitive data. The evaluation is per-
formed on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 2.3 GHz/64bit/8GB machine.
SPARSI is implemented in MATLAB and uses MOSEK, a com-
mercial optimization toolbox.
Real-World Dataset: For the first set of experiments we present
how SPARSI can be applied to real world domains. We considered
a social networking scenario as discussed in Example 1. We used
the Brighkite dataset published by Cho et al. [2]. This dataset was
extracted from Brightkite, a former location-based social network-
ing service provider where users shared their locations by checking-
in. Each check-in entry contains information about the id of the
user, the timestamp and location of the check-in. The dataset con-
tains the public check-in data of users and the friendship network of
users. The original dataset contains 4.5 million check-ins, 58, 228
users and 214, 078 edges. We subsampled the dataset and ex-
tracted a dataset comprised of 365, 907 check-ins. The correspond-
ing friendship network contains 3, 266 nodes and 2, 935 edges. In
Section 6.1, we discuss how we modeled the utility and information
disclosure for this data.
Synthetic Data: For the second set of experiments we used syn-
thetically generated data to understand the properties of different
disclosure functions and the performance of the proposed algo-
rithms better. There are two data-related components in our frame-
work. The first is a hypergraph that describes the interaction be-
tween data entries and sensitive properties (see Section 2.1), and
the second is a set of weights wda representing the utility received
when data entry d ∈ D is published to adversary a ∈ A. The syn-
thetic data are generated as follows. First, we set the total number
of data entries |D| ∈ {50, 100, 200, 300, 500}, the total number of
sensitive properties |P | ∈ {5, 10, 50, 100}, and the total number
of adversaries |A| ∈ {2, 3, 5, 7, 10}.
Next, we describe the scheme we used to generate the utility
weights wda. There are two particular properties that need to be
satisfied by such a scheme. The first one is that assigning any entry
to an adversary should induce some minimum utility, since it al-
lows us to fulfil the task under consideration (see Example 2). The
second one is that there are cases where certain data items should
induce higher utilities when assigned to specific adversaries, e.g.,
some workers may have better accuracy than others in crowdsourc-
ing, or advertisers may pay more for certain types of data.
The utility weights need to satisfy the aforementioned proper-
ties. To achieve this, we first choose a minimum utility value umin
from a unifrom distribution U(0, 0.1). Then, we iterate over all
possible data-to-adversary assignments and set the corresponding
weight wda to a value drawn from a uniform distribution U(0.8, 1)
with probability pu, or to umin with probability 1−pu. For our ex-
periments we set the probability pu to 0.4. Notice that both prop-
erties are satisfied. Finally, weights are scaled down by dividing
them with the number of adversaries |A|.
Next, we describe how we generate a random hypergraph H =
(X,E), with |X| = |D| and |E| = |P |, describing the interaction
between data entries and sensitive properties. To create H we sim-
ply generate an equivalent bipartite dependency graph G (see Sec-
tion 2.1) and convert that to the equivalent dependecy hypergraph.
In particular we iterate over the possible data to sensitive property
pairs and insert the corresponding edge to G with probability pf .
For our experiments we set pf to 0.3.
Algorithms: We evaluated the following algorithms:
• RAND+: Each data entry is assigned to exactly t adversaries.
The probability of assigning a data entry to an adversary is
proportional to the corresponding utility weight wda. We run
the random partitioning a 100 times, and select the data-to-
adversary assignment that maximizes the objective function.
• LP: We solve the LP relaxation of the optimization problems for
step (Section 4.1) and linear (Section 4.2) disclosure functions.
We generate an integral solution from the resulting fractional
solution using naive randomized rounding (see Section 4.1).
Note that the constraints are satisfied in expectations. More-
over, we perform a second pass over the derived integral solu-
tion to guarantee that the cardinality constrains are satisfied. If
a data item is not assigned to an adversary, we assign it to the
adversary with the highest weight, i.e., corresponding fractional
solution. On the other hand is a data item is assigned to more
adversaries, we remove those with the lowest weight. This is a
naive, yet effective, rounding scheme because the fractional so-
lutions we get are close to the integral ones. More sophisticated
rounding techniques can be used [4]. We run the rounding 100
times and select the data-to-adversary assignment with maxi-
mum value of objective.
• ILP: We solve the exact ILP algorithm for step and linear dis-
closure functions.
• GREEDY: Algorithm 1 with GREEDY strategy for picking a
candidate
• GRASP: Algorithm 1 with GRASP strategy for picking the can-
didate assignments using n = 5 and r = 10.
• GREEDYL: Local myopic variant of Algorithm 1 (see Section
5.4 with GREEDY strategy for picking a candidate).
• GRASPL: Local myopic variant of Algorithm 1 (see Section
5.4 with GRASP strategy for picking candidates) using n =
min(k, 3) and r = 10.
Evaluation. To evaluate the performance of the aforementioned
algorithms we used the following metrics: (1) the total utility u cor-
responding to the final assignment, (2) the information disclosure
f for the final assignment and (3) the tradeoff between utility and
disclosure, given by u + λ(τI − f) . We evaluated the different
algorithms using different step and linear information disclosure
functions for TRADEOFF.
For all experiments we set λ = 1 and assume an additive util-
ity function of the form ua(Sa) =
∑
d∈D wdaxda∑
d∈D
∑
top−t(A)∈A wda
, where
xda is an indicator variable that takes value 1 when data entry d
is revealed to adversary a and 0 otherwise, and top− t(A) returns
the top t adversaries with respect to weights wda. Observe that
the normalization used corresponds to the maximum total utility a
valid data-to-adversary assignment may have, when ignoring dis-
closure. Using this value ensures that the total utility and the quan-
tity τI −f have the same scale [0, 1]. For convenience we fixed the
upper information disclosure to τI = 0. Finally, for RAND+ we
perform 10 runs and report the average, while for LP we perform
the aforementioned rounding procedure 10 times and report the av-
erage. The corresponding standard errors are shown as error bars
in the plots below.
6.1 Real Data Experiments
We start by presenting how SPARSI can be applied to real-world
applications. In particular, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed local-search framework meta-heuristic on generic informa-
tion disclosure functions using Brightkite. As described in the be-
ginning of the section, this dataset contains the check-in locations
of users and their corresponding friendship network. As illustrated
in Example 1 we desire to distribute the check-in information to
advertisers, while minimizing the information we disclose for the
structure of the network. We, first, show how SPARSI can be used
in this scenario.
Utility Weights. We start by modeling the utility provided when
advertisers receive a subset of data entries. As mentioned above
each check-in entry contains information about location. We as-
sume a total number of k advertisers, so that each adversary is par-
ticularly interested in check-in entries that occurred in a certain ge-
ographical area. Given an adversary a ∈ A, we draw wda from a
uniform distribution U(0.8, 1) for all entries d ∈ D that satisfy the
location criteria of the adversary, and wda = 0.1 otherwise. We
simulate this process by performing a random partitioning of the
location ids across adversaries. As mentioned above we assume an
additive utility function.
Sensitive Properties and Information Disclosure. The sensi-
tive property in the particular setup is the structure of the social
network. More precisely, we require that no information is leaked
about the existence of any friendship link among users. It is easy to
see that each friendship link is associated with a sensitive property.
Now, we examine how check-in entries leak information about the
presence of a friendship link. Cho et al. [2] proved that there is
a strong correlation between the trajectory similarity and the exis-
tence of a friendship link for two users. Computing the trajectory
similarity for a pair of users is easy and can be done by computing
the cosine similarity of the users given the published set of check-
ins. Because of this strong correlation we assume that the informa-
tion leakage for a sensitive property, i.e., a the link between a pair
of users, is equal to the trajectory similarity.
More precisely, let Da ⊂ D be the check-in data published to
adversary a ∈ A. Let U denote the set of users referenced in Da.
Given a sensitive property p = e(ui, uj), ui, uj ∈ U, i 6= j we
have that the information disclosure for p is:
f(Da)[p] = CosineSimilarity(Da(ui), Da(uj)) (20)
whereDa(ui) andDa(uj) denote the set of check-in data for users
ui and uj respectively. We aggregate the given check-ins based on
their unique pairs of users and locations, and we extract 15, 661
data entries that contain the user information, the location and the
number of times that user visited that particular location. Cosine
similarity is computed over these counts new data entries.
Results. As mentioned above, we aim to minimize the infor-
mation leaked about any edge in the network. We model this re-
quirement by considering the average case information leakage and
setting τI = 0. In particular, we would like that no information
is leaked at all if possible. Moreover, to partition the dataset we
solve the corresponding TRADEOFF problem. Since we consider
cosine similarity we are limited to using RAND+ and one of the
local-search heuristics. In particular, we compare the quality of
the solutions for RAND+, GREEDYL and GRASPL. Due to the
fact that our implementation of GREEDY and GRASP is single-
threaded, these algorithms do not scale for this particular task, and
thus, are omitted. However, as illustrated later (see Section 6.2),
these myopic algorithms are very efficient in minimizing the infor-
mation leakage, thus, suitable for our current objective. Again, we
run experiments for |A| ∈ {2, 3, 5, 7, 10}.
First, we point out that under all experiments GREEDYL and
GRASPL reported data-to-adversary assignments with zero disclo-
sure. This means that our algorithms were able to distribute the
data entries across adversaries so that no information at all is leaked
about the structure of the social network (i.e., friendship links) to
any adversary. On the other hand the average information dis-
closure for RAND+ ranges from 0.99 almost full disclosure to 0.1
as the number of adversaries varies from 2 to 10 (see Table 1).
Disclosing the structure of the entire network with probability al-
most 1, violates our initial specifications, hence, RAND+ fails to
solve the problem when the number of adversaries is small. As the
number of adversaries increases, the average amount of disclosed
information decreases.
We continue our analysis and focus on the utility and the tradeoff
objective. The corresponding results are shown in Figure 2. Figures
2(a) and 2(b) correspond to the utility and utility-disclosure trade-
off respectively. The corresponding disclosure is shown in Table
1. As shown, for a small number of adversaries both GREEDYL
and GRASPL generate solutions that induce low values for the total
utility. This is expected since both algorithms give particular em-
phasis to minimizing information disclosure due to the tradeoff for-
mulation of the underlying optimization problem. As the number
of adversaries increases both algorithms can exploit the structure
of the problem better, and offer solutions that induce utility values
that are comparable or higher than the ones reported by RAND+.
However, looking only at utility values can be misleading, as a
very high utility value might also incur a high disclosure value. If
fact, RAND+ follows this behavior exactly. The high utility data to
adversary assignments, when the number of adversaries is small, is
associated with almost full disclosure of the structure of the entire
social network. This is captured in Figure 2(b), where we see that
local-search algorithms clearly outperform RAND+ since no infor-
mation is disclosed (see Table 1). As shown in this figure, in most
cases, the average objective value for RAND+ is significantly lower
than the ones reported by both GREEDYL and GRASPL. Recall
that we compute the average over multiple runs of RAND+, where
for each run we execute the algorithm multiple times and consider
Table 1: Average information disclosure reported by RAND+,
GREEDYL and GREEDYL for Brightkite. Notice that local-
search algorithms generate solutions that reveal no information
about the structure of the friendship network. Standard errors
are reported in the parenthesis.
Avg. Information Disclosure for different values of k
Alg. k=2 k=3 k=5 k=7 k=10
RAND+ 0.99(0) 0.99(0.3) 0.3(0.4) 0.1(0.18) 0.1(0.018)
GREEDYL 0 0 0 0 0
GRASPL 0 0 0 0 0
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Figure 2: Tradeoff objective and utility for Brightkite. RAND+
generates solutions with high utility but almost full disclo-
sure (see Table 1). This leads to a poor tradeoff value.
GREEDYL and GRASPL disclose no information, and outper-
form RAND+ with respect to the overall optimization objective.
the best solution reported. The large error bars are indicative of the
non-robustness of RAND+ for this problem.
6.2 Synthetic Data Experiments
In this section, we present our results based on the synthetic data.
We examined the behavior of the proposed algorithms under sev-
eral scenarios, where we varied the properties of the dataset to be
partitioned, the number of adversaries and the family of disclosure
functions considered.
Step Functions. We started by considering step functions. Un-
der this family of disclosure functions, both DISCBUDGET and
TRADEOFF correspond to the same optimization problem (see Sec-
tion 4.1). Moreover, assuming feasibility of the optimization prob-
lem, information disclosure will always be zero. In such cases con-
sidering the total utility alone is sufficient to compare the perfor-
mance of the different algorithms. However, when information is
disclosed, comparing the number of fully disclosed properties al-
lows us to evaluate the performance of the different algorithms.
First, we fixed the number of data entries in the dataset to be
|D| = 500 and considered values of |P | in {5, 10, 50, 100}. Figure
3 shows the utility derived by the data-to-adversary assignment cor-
responding to different algorithms for |P | = 50. As depicted, all
algorithms that exploit the structure of the dependency graph while
solving the underlying optimization problem (i.e., LP, GREEDY,
GREEDYL, GRASP and GRASPL) outperform RAND+. In most
cases, LP, GREEDYL, GREEDY and GRASP where able to find
the optimal solution that ILP reported. The high performance of
the LP algorithm is justified by the fact that the fractional solution
reported was in fact an integral solution.
GRASPL found solutions with non-optimal utilities, which are
still better than RAND+. We conjecture that this performance de-
crease is due to randomization. This is more obvious if we contrast
the performance of GRASPL with GRASP. We can see that ran-
domization leads to worse solutions (with respect to utility) when
keeping a myopic view on the given optimization problem. On
the other hand randomization is helpful in the case of non-myopic
local-search. Recall that the reported numbers correspond to no in-
formation disclosure, while missing values correspond to full dis-
closure of at least one sensitive property. As depicted GREEDY
failed to find a valid solution when splitting the data across 2 ad-
versaries. However, when randomization was used, GRASP was
able to find the optimal solution. Similar performance for different
values of |D|. These results are omitted due to space constraints.
Next, we ran a second set of experiments to investigate how the
performance of the proposed heuristics with respect to the amount
of disclosed information. Recall that all local-search algorithms
do not explicitly check for infeasible values of disclosure for step
functions, since they optimize the tradeoff between utility and dis-
closure. Therefore, they might report infeasible solutions. We fixed
the number of sensitive properties to |P | = 50, and the number of
adversaries to k = 2, and we varied the number of data items |D|.
We considered |D| ∈ {100, 200, 300, 500}. We observed the same
behavior as in the previous experiment, i.e., all local-search heuris-
tics failed to report feasible solutions.
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Figure 3: Utility for step disclosure functions. All reported
numbers correspond to no information disclosure, while miss-
ing values to full disclosure.
The corresponding results are presented in Table 2. As the num-
ber of data entries was increasing for a fixed number of sensitive
properties, the number of fully disclosed properties started decreas-
ing. This behavior is expected as the number of data entries per
single property increases, and hence, it is easier for our heuristics
to find a partitioning where the data items for a single property are
partitioned across adversaries inducing zero disclosure.
Table 2: Fully disclosed properties for data-to-adversary as-
signments for step disclosure functions. As the number of data
entries per property increases, local-search heuristics exploit
the structure of the problem better and report solutions with
fewer fully disclosed properties.
Number of fully disclosed properties (|P | = 50, k = 2)
Alg. |D|=100 |D|=200 |D|=300 |D|=500
GREEDYL 11 6 3 0
GRASPL 11 6 4 0
GREEDY 11 6 3 1
GRASP 11 6 5 0
The experiments above show that GREEDY and GRASP are vi-
able alternatives for the case of step functions. However, for harder
instances of the problem, where the number of sensitive proper-
ties is large and the number of adversaries is small, solving the LP
relaxation offers a more robust and reliable alternative.
Linear Functions. We continue our discussion and present our
experimental results for linear functions. First, we compared the
quality of solutions produced when solving DISCBUDGET and TRADE-
OFF optimally for both worst and average disclosure. We gener-
ated a synthetic instance of the problem by setting |D| = 50 and
|P | = 10, and we run ILP for |A| = {2, 3, 5, 7, 10}. We set the
maximum allowed disclosure to τI = 0.9 and t = 2.
The utility and corresponding disclosure are shown in Figure
4 when DISCBUDGET and TRADEOFF are solved optimally. As
shown, the worst case disclosure remains at the same levels across
different number of adversaries. Now, consider the case of average
disclosure (see Equation 2). We see that for both versions of the
optimization problem the disclosure is decreasing as the number of
adversaries increases. However, the optimization corresponding to
TRADEOFF is able to exploit the presence of multiple adversaries
better, to reduce disclosure while maintaining utility high.
Consequently, we evaluated RAND+, LP, GREEDYL, GRASPL,
GREEDY and GRASP on solving TRADEOFF. We set upper dis-
closure τI = 0 denoting our requirement to minimize disclosure as
much as possible. We do not report any results for the ILP since
for |D| > 50, it was not able to terminate in reasonable time. First,
we fixed the number of properties to |P | = 50 and considered
instances with |D| = {100, 200, 300, 500}. We considered av-
erage disclosure. We show the performance of the algorithms for
|D| = 500 in Figure 5. As shown, LP, GREEDY and GRASP out-
perform RAND+ both in terms of the overall utility and the average
disclosure. In fact RAND+ performs poorly as it returns solutions
with higher disclosure but lower utility than the LP. Furthermore,
we see that the performance gap between the local-search algo-
rithms and RAND+ keeps increasing as the number of adversaries
increases. This is expected as the proposed heuristics take into ac-
count the structure of the underlying dependency graph, and, hence,
can exploit the presence of multiple adversaries to achieve a higher
overall utility and lower disclosure.
Furthermore, we see that solutions derived using the LP approx-
imation provide the largest utility, while solutions derived using
the proposed local-search algorithms minimize the disclosure. As
presented in Figure 5 using the myopic construction returns solu-
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Figure 4: The (a) utility and (b) disclosure when solving DIS-
CBUDGET and TRADEOFF optimally. TRADEOFF can exploit
the presence of multiple adversaries better, to reduce disclosure
while maintaining high utility.
tions with low overall utility. This behavior is expected since the
algorithm does not maintain a global view of the data-to-adversary
assignment. Observe that randomization improves the quality of
the solution with respect to total utility, when the global-view con-
struction is used (see GREEDY and GRASP). When the myopic
construction is used, randomization gives lower quality solutions.
Measuring the average disclosure is an indicator for the over-
all performance of the proposed algorithms. However, it does not
provide us with detailed feedback about the information disclosure
across properties for the different algorithms. To understand what
is the exact information disclosure for the solutions returned by the
different algorithms, we measured the total number of properties
that exceeded a particular disclosure level. We present the corre-
sponding plots for |D| = 500, |P | = 50, k = 2 and k = 7
in Figure 6. As shown, the proposed search-algorithms can ex-
ploit the presence of multiple adversaries very effectively in order
to minimize disclosure. If we compare Figures 6(a) and 6(a) we see
that the total number of properties reaches zero for a significantly
smaller disclosure threshold in the presence of ten adversaries.
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Figure 6: The number of properties that exceed a particular
disclosure level for |D| = 500 and |P | = 50. GREEDYL and
GRASPL can exploit the presence of multiple adversaries more
effectively to minimize disclosure. The total number of proper-
ties reaches zero for a significantly smaller disclosure threshold
in the presence of ten adversaries.
7. RELATED WORK
There has been much work on the problem of publishing (or al-
lowing aggregate queries over) sensitive datasets (see surveys [1,
5]). Here, information disclosure is characterized by a privacy def-
inition, which is either syntactic constraints on the output dataset
(e.g., k-anonymity [20] or `-diversity [17]), or constraints on the
publishing or query answering algorithm (e.g., -differential pri-
vacy [5]). Each privacy definition is associated with a privacy level
(k, `, , etc.) that represents a bound on the information disclo-
sure. Typical algorithmic techniques for data publishing or query
answering, which include generalization, or coarsening of values,
suppression, output perturbation, and sampling, attempt to maxi-
mize the utility of the published data given some level of privacy
(i.e., a bound on the disclosure). Krause et al. [14] consider the
problem of trading-off utility for disclosure, and consider general
submodular utility and supermodular disclosure functions. This pa-
per formulates a submodular optimization problem, and presents
efficient algorithm for the same. However, all the above techniques
assume that all the data is published to a single adversary. Even
when multiple parties may ask different queries, prior work makes
a worst-case assumption that they arbitrarily collude. On the other
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Figure 5: Tradeoff objective, utility and disclosure for linear functions considering average disclosure (|D| = 500, |P | = 50). LP,
GREEDY and GRASP outperform RAND+ both in terms of total utility and average disclosure. LP maximizes utility, while the
local-search heuristics are the most effective in minimizing disclosure.
hand, in this paper, we formulate the novel problem of multiple
non-colluding adversary, and develop near-optimal algorithms for
trading-off utility for information disclosure in this setting.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
More and more sensitive information is released on the Web
and processed by online services, naturally raising concerns re-
lated to privacy in domains where detailed and fine-grained infor-
mation must be published. In this paper, motivated by applications
like online advertising and crowd-sourcing markets, we introduce
the problem of privacy-aware k-way data partitioning, namely, the
problem of splitting a sensitive dataset among k untrusted parties.
We present SPARSI a theoretical framework that allows us to for-
mally define the problem as an optimization of the tradeoff between
the utility derived by publishing the data and the maximum infor-
mation disclosure incurred to any single adversary. Moreover, we
prove that solving it is NP-hard by reducing it to hypergraph par-
titioning. We present a performance analysis of different approxi-
mation algorithms for a variety of synthetic and real-world datasets,
and demonstrate how SPARSI can be applied in the domain of on-
line advertising. Our algorithms are able to partition user-location
data to multiple advertisers while ensuring that almost no sensitive
information about potential friendship links about these users can
be inferred by any advertiser.
Our research so far has raised several interesting research di-
rections. To our knowledge, this is the first work that leverages
the presence of multiple adversaries to minimize the disclosure of
private information while maximizing utility. While we provided
worst case guarantees for several families of disclosure functions,
an interesting future direction is to examine if rigorous guarantees
can be provided for other widely-used information disclosure func-
tions like information gain, or if the current ones can be improved.
Finally, it is of particular interest to consider how the proposed
framework can be extended to consider interactive scenarios where
data are published to adversaries more than once, or in streaming
data where the partitioning must be done in an online manner.
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